Introduction
David Miller's theory of nationalism and national responsibility offers the leading alternative 'anticosmopolitan' theory of global justice. 1 His theory claims that 'nations' may be held responsible for the benefits and harms resulting from their collective decisions. Nations may be held remedially responsible to help nations in need even where the former lack causal or moral responsibility, for example. The argument is that there are persons requiring remedy and so there is a need to develop a theory that can help us determine how we can choose those nations that should provide assistance to those in need.
This article critically examines Miller's position that remedial responsibilities-the responsibilities of nations to remedy others in need-can and should only be satisfied by nations. I argue that the characteristics that define and justify a particular understanding of nationalism extend to further constructions of identity, such as religious affiliation and other connections. The problem with Miller's position is that it is overly narrow by focusing solely on our national identities as the characteristic most relevant for determining remedial responsibilities. It is possible and desirable to widen our focus, enriching our understanding of global justice and remedial responsibility. Moreover, this wider perspective is an extension, and not a break from, Miller's position. Our shared identities should have significance for considerations of global justice and they can help us develop a more robust view of anticosmopolitanism.
The article's structure is as follows. First, I identify Miller's theory of nationalism.
My focus will be on the reasons for why he argues that our shared identity as co-nationals connects with his argument for a connection theory of remedial responsibilities. Secondly, I
argue that these reasons can and should support other types of shared identity that should be included within his connection theory. Thirdly, I conclude with observations on the wider implications for cosmopolitan global justice theorists.
Miller's Theory of Nationalism
Miller argues for the importance of nationality: a person's nationality is not morally irrelevant in considerations of global justice. 2 The moral relevance of nationality arises from a shared relationship and identity that a person has with co-nationals. This distinction is perhaps best introduced with an illustrative example. Consider the missing child case: a child is missing and there are fears for her safety. 3 We have at least a prima facie moral reason to help with search and rescue efforts. We need not have any special connection to this particular child in order to recognize that we have a moral reason to help where we can.
Therefore, we do not need to have a relationship to the missing child in order to accept that we should help.
Now consider the our missing child case: our child is missing and there remain fears for her safety. The difference here is that the missing child is our own. We have a moral reason to help with search and rescue efforts in both cases. However, we have a further moral reason to help in the second case on account of the fact that the missing child is our child: we have a special connection between us. We might deny that we should give any additional moral weight to one child over another where both are equally situated. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the situations of the missing children in these two cases. This difference lies in their shared relationships with others and this difference is not morally irrelevant. connections over wider institutional connections. Furthermore, our shared identity as conationals can provide an additional moral reason to assist other co-nationals arising from our shared identity.
Miller argues that are several conditions that, if satisfied, may support this position about identity and special duties. 6 The first reason is that the relationship we enjoy amongst our co-nationals is intrinsically valuable. 7 It is certainly true that many people find their identity within a political community of significant value, but there are many different potential identities that others may find importance in. 8 The problem is determining which, if any, should count for considerations of global justice. Miller explains:
[P]eople who deny the significance of their national identity in circumstances where such an identity is available to them are missing out on the opportunity to place their individual lives in the context of a collective project that has been handed down from generation to generation, involving among other things the shaping of the physical environment in which they live, and whose future they could help to determine, by political participation and in other ways. The issue here is not whether this is the highest human good-for most people it is unlikely to be-but whether it is one of the human goods that have intrinsic value, alongside family life, creative work, and so forth. National identity can be intrinsically valuable and, as such, our shared identity with conationals may give rise to new moral weight on account of the value that we place in our shared identity. Moreover, the continuity of the national community is also seen as valuable, not least for helping to sustain their shared identity.
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A second reason is that our duties to co-nationals should be integral to the relationship that we share with others. A political community exists as a community when its members can identify and recognize each other as fellow community members, such as where each adheres to and participates in a shared public culture. This recognition of shared identity helps make possible special duties to co-nationals. 11 We identify with one another within our mutually recognized value of our shared relationship. Our shared identity in a community of value for us can allow us to accept the view that co-nationals may deserve additional moral consideration over those deserved by non-nationals.
Finally, a third reason is that there need not be any intrinsic injustice caused to nonnationals even when we afford additional moral weight to the claims of co-nationals. This is because the view that co-nationals may be deserving of additional moral weight need not entail that we treat non-nationals to less than they deserve. Instead, we may claim no more than that we have reason to offer co-nationals a consideration beyond that which they might deserve otherwise. There is then no injustice to recognizing different treatment between conationals and non-nationals.
Together, these reasons offer support to the view that it may not be unjust for us to choose to help our co-nationals where they and non-nationals are similarly situated and we must make a choice between them. This is on account of our shared identity with co-nationals that satisfies three specific tests: our co-national relationship is intrinsically valuable, integral to our relationship as co-nationals, and honouring this moral significance does not compel us to give less than what is deserved to non-nationals.
One result is that not all shared identities pass these tests. A person's identity with another within a white supremacist organization would fail the test of intrinsic value, for example. This is because such a shared identity lacks intrinsic value in virtue of its wrongfulness. Furthermore, our recognizing an additional moral reason in favour of conationals need not entail that we fail to treat non-nationals to less than they deserve. Let us suppose that a non-national was in need of assistance we could readily offer, but we decide instead to socialize with a co-national. This would be wrong on this view because the need of the non-national was greater, all things considered. Co-nationality matters where a conational and non-national are similarly situated: where we must choose between them our shared identity may serve as an additional moral reason in favour of a conational, but conationality is not a trump card.
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Our shared nationality additionally entails national responsibility amongst conationals, provided our identity satisfies specific tests. Miller says: 'By virtue of identifying with compatriots, sharing their values, and receiving the benefits that national communities provide, we are also involved in collective responsibility for the things that nations do'. 13 We receive benefits from our membership in a nation with a special relationship to our co- 
Beyond Nationalism
We have now seen how a shared identity that passes three tests may have moral importance on Miller's account. This shared identity gives rise to a shared responsibility: national identity grounds national responsibility, including remedial responsibilities to help others in need. One problem that has gone largely unnoticed is that Miller's theory of nationalism and national identity apply to additional shared identities. 20 We can accept his understanding of nationalism beyond (and even without) nations. I explain why this is the case in this section and offer a limited defence.
Consider the tests for the moral significance of shared co-national identity: our shared identity is intrinsically valuable, integral to our relationship, and honouring this moral significance does not compel us to give less than what is deserved to non-nationals. But it should also be clear that a shared co-national identity is not the only identity that can meet the standard of these three tests.
One such example is a shared identity with others within an organized religion. their membership in a religious community. There is reason to claim that shared religious identity can possess intrinsic value and entail a reciprocally recognized responsibility amongst members not unlike persons sharing a national identity. Moreover, organized religions-again, often transnational in size and scope-may also play a role in global affairs.
The Roman Catholic Church is an illustration of this. The Church has its own public culture as well as other public goods, not unlike a nation in these respects. 22 Church members enjoy a shared identity that has value for each member, as well as creating specific responsibilities between them. Not unlike other organized religions, the Church is highly active in shaping its public culture in a variety of ways even beyond worship practices. This may include maintaining pastoral support groups, administering schools and universities, missionary work, and publishing. Together, these activities support a shared identity amongst
Catholics that is not without significant value for them.
While it is undeniable that there are significant differences between national identity and religious identity, it remains the case that both may satisfy the same tests. Nor should a shared religious identity be the only non-national identity that has moral significance in this regard. One possibility is our shared identity within a profession. We can have a shared identity through our work, an idea argued for by Hegel: he called work 'a second family' where we join together with others in a common project and recognize special responsibilities towards one another. 27 An example may be academic philosophers. 24 There is a further problem with the weighting given to each principle. But while this example may seem compelling, it is unclear whether it passes Miller's three tests. For example, occupations can be intrinsically valuable. I already argued academic philosophy is one such profession. Perhaps even marketing in the online search engine industry might also make this standard. Nonetheless, it is clear not all occupations are so and we would require some further account of why these other professions pass the first of three tests, that the association is intrinsically valuable to its members. It is further unclear whether the mutual duties to others shared in a profession satisfy the test of being integral to that relationship: it is unlikely to be true in every case and so some further account is required.
Additionally, academic philosophers share an identity across institutions and national boundaries, but it is uncertain how many other professions have this vocational character. To example is at least arguable and it would seem plausibly no less arguable for other more vocational professions amongst many others.
32
To summarise my argument thus far. Miller's theory of nationality and national responsibility rests upon a view of shared identity. Not all shared identities should be imbued with moral significance, but only those that satisfy certain tests. A shared national identity that meets these tests can count, on his view, as a nation with national responsibilities and serve as an agent in global affairs. The problem is that this view is too narrow. There may be other shared identities that can also meet these tests, such as a shared religious or professional identity. These shared identities themselves also give rise to communities which may also meaningfully participate in international affairs. Nations may often play a leading role in satisfying remedial responsibilities, but it is a mistake to argue that nations should serve this role alone. Other communities based upon shared identities passing the same tests can also serve in this role.
The satisfaction of remedial responsibilities is then more complex than Miller claims insofar as it is an arena of more than nations. However, this more complex picture better fits the world as we find it. Religious and other organizations play a supporting role in relief efforts now. Any plausible theory of global justice can and should include them in some way.
This realization is not a rejection of Miller's position as it is an amendment to it. Moreover, my amendment has the benefits for his theory that it is clearly compatible with and it better accounts for a wider range of global agents that may meaningfully participate in remedial efforts. consideration to some over others on account of our having a shared national identity as long as we do not give non-nationals less than they might deserve. There is agreement on this substantial point which blurs the degree to which Miller's theory of nationalism can serve as an anticosmopolitan theory of global justice.
There is also substantial agreement between Miller's position and Martha Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism on this position. 37 Nussbaum accepts that our shared identities as co nationals have an important value for us. However, our co-national identity ought not deny the possibility of our identification of humanity more generally. We should consider ourselves human beings first and co-nationals second. 38 Nussbaum recognizes that our identification as human beings first is not our most immediate form of identity. Instead, she refers to a conception of identity as a series of concentric circles with roots in Stoicism. The first circle is our self-identity. A second circle includes the first and expands to incorporate our identity as members of our immediate family with a third expanding further still encircling our extended family. The fourth and succeeding circles include each previous circle and encompass our identity with neighbours, local groups, and fellow nationals before concluding with the largest circle of all, namely, the whole of humanity. Our project should be to draw these circles closer together so that they overlap and no one circle of identity has a priority over any other. Nussbaum says:
We need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious. We need not think of them as superficial, and we may think of our identity as constituted partly by them . . . we should also work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect. 39 The shared identity that forms the ties that bind us together commands a space in our considerations of justice on this picture as well. Nussbaum is also aware of the potential utopianism of her position in noting that cosmopolitans may 'have a hard time gripping the imagination' because our common humanity by itself may fail to excite the 'intensity and passion' that more local identities of community and co-nationality may arouse. 40 The way to bridge this gap is to build up from our more immediate shared identities, such as our identity within a family, toward our more universally shared identities. Thus, the route to Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism is through a recognition of how our different identities may build and develop off of each other. The direct relevance for our discussion is that Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism may also take seriously our relationship with co-nationals as an identity with moral significance. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the substantive claims behind Miller's defence of the moral significance of nationalism is a position that is central to his larger theory of global justice. It is also a defence that many cosmopolitans may accept. For example, Gillian Brock argues persuasively:
